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This paper estimates the returns to insiders when they trade their company's stock.
We first construct a rolling “purchase portfolio” that holds all shares purchased by
insiders for a six-month period and an analogous “sale portfolio” that holds all shares
sold by insiders for six months.  The six-month horizon is chosen to coincide with the
“short-swing” rule of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; a rule that prohibits
profit-taking by insiders for offsetting trades within six months. We then employ
performance-evaluation methods to analyze the returns to the purchase and sale
portfolios.  This approach yields a proxy for the value-weighted returns to insider
transactions beginning on the day after their execution and avoids the statistical
difficulties that plague event studies on long-horizon returns.
Our methods are designed to estimate the returns earned by insiders themselves
and thereby differ from the previous insider-trading literature, which focuses on the
“informativeness” of insider trades for other investors. Using a comprehensive sample of
reported insider transactions from 1975-1996, we find that the purchase portfolio earns
abnormal returns of more than 50 basis points per month. About one-quarter of these
abnormal returns accrue within the first five days after the initial transaction, and one-half
accrue within the first month. The sale portfolio does not earn abnormal returns.  Our
portfolio-based approach also allows for straightforward decompositions of performance
by various characteristics; we find that the abnormal returns to insider trades in small
firms are not significantly different from those in large firms, and that top executives do
not earn higher abnormal returns than do other insiders.1
1. Introduction
What are the returns to insider trading? This question has scientific implications for the study
of market efficiency, and public policy implications for the regulation of insider trading.
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent a complete answer, as the holding periods of insider
transactions can only be imperfectly inferred from the regulatory filings.   These limitations have
led researchers to largely ignore this question in favor of studies that focus on a different aspect
of insider trading – namely, the ability of outside investors to profit by following “intensive”
insider trading.  In this paper, we take advantage of legal restrictions on the holding periods of
profitable insider trades – Rule 16b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or the “short-swing”
rule – to estimate a proxy for the returns to insider trading itself.
By law, corporate insiders must file monthly SEC reports about their trades in their
company’s stock, and these reports are quickly made public.1 This data on insider trading has
inspired a large academic literature that studies the cross-sectional variation of future stock
returns as a function of past insider-trading activity.  Representative articles include Lorie and
Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986) and (1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin and
Howe (1990), and Lakonishok and Lee (1998).2 This literature focuses on the abnormal returns
to firms in relation to the “intensity” of insiders’ purchases and sales over well-defined periods.
For example, a stock may be labeled an “insider buy” for a month if at least three insiders bought
the stock and no insiders sold it.  Alternatively, the intensity definition may rely on the net
number of shares purchased and sold by insiders during the month.  We refer to such rules as
“intensive-trading” criteria.  These studies use a variety of intensive-trading criteria for many
                                               
1 Section 2 discusses the definition of a corporate insider, and the regulation and reporting requirements of their
trades.
2 A related literature that studies insiders’ ability to forecast the time-series of aggregate stock returns, a topic we do
not discuss in this paper.  See Seyhun (1988), (1992), and (1998), and Lakonishok and Lee (1998).2
different samples, and are nearly unanimous concluding that stocks that are intensely bought tend
to outperform relevant benchmarks over a subsequent period, and that those that are intensely
sold tend to underperform.    They provide mixed evidence on whether other investors can profit,
after transactions costs, by using this information.   Seyhun (1998) summarizes this evidence and
concludes that several different trading rules lead to profits.
Intensive-trading criteria are logical filter rules when assessing the “informativeness” of
insider trading for future returns, and for providing investors with implementable buy and sell
signals for individual stocks. But what if we want a proxy for what insiders earn on their own
trades?  For that purpose, intensive-trading criteria have several drawbacks. First, the use of
individual stocks as the main unit of analysis makes it impossible to determine a value-weighted
return to all trades; the stocks with intensive buying or selling activity may comprise a small or a
large part of overall insider trading. Second, the requirement that intensity be defined over some
interval means that stocks are only classified after these intervals end.  Therefore, the returns on
the days immediately following most trades are excluded from the analysis. Third, the need to
choose a specific intensity rule can result in data-snooping biases.  Attempts to overcome these
challenges by applying event-study methods to daily returns for all trades (Pascutti, 1996) face
statistical difficulties due to cross-sectional correlation across trades and biases in computing
long-run abnormal returns.3
We overcome these difficulties by employing performance-evaluation methods on value-
weighted portfolios. We imagine that all insider purchases are placed into a portfolio beginning
on the day after their execution and are held for exactly six months. This “purchase portfolio” is
like a shadow mutual fund “managed” by the combination of all insiders.  Since the holdings in
                                                                                                                                                      
3 See Barber and Lyon (1997), Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1998), and Kothari and Warner (1997).3
this portfolio are weighted in proportion to the values of the underlying insider trades, the returns
on the portfolio would proxy for the value-weighted returns earned by all insider purchases over
six months.   Similarly, we can imagine a “sale portfolio” comprised of all shares sold by
insiders, with those shares held in the portfolio for exactly six months.
An important advantage of this portfolio-based approach is that it enables us to use
performance-evaluation techniques to adjust for the “style” of insider trading – i.e., to take
account of implicit or explicit size, value, and momentum strategies used by insiders. Another
advantage is that it allows portfolios to be decomposed by time horizon, firm characteristics, and
trading volume.  By constructing subportfolios, point estimates and standard errors can be
obtained for the abnormal returns to value-weighted insider trades conditional on each of these
elements. The six-month holding period, while arbitrary, corresponds to the minimum time that
an insider must hold a stock while still retaining profits from an offsetting transaction. Rule 16b
of the SEA, the short-swing rule, states that "profits made by insiders from transactions
involving equity securities of publicly held companies, when a purchase and a sale are made less
than six months apart, must be disgorged and paid over to the issuer"4.  Thus, any profits realized
for holding periods less than six months would have to be returned to the company.5  In some
sense, then, the returns to our constructed portfolios can be viewed as maximum realizable
returns from the reported transactions. Ideally, of course, we would prefer to know the true
holding periods.  There are several limitations that make such an analysis impossible for U.S.
data. In practice, while we can calculate a reliable time-series of insider holdings, much of these
holdings have come from stock grants, option exercises, and stock amassed before inside status
                                                                                                                                                      
4 Understanding Securities Law, Soderquist (1997).
5 Agrawal and Jaffe (1995) find that this rule deters purchases of stock by insiders in merger-target firms.  We are
unaware of any other study that explicitly relies on the 6-month minimum short-swing horizon.4
was achieved, so it is not possible to identify the change in holdings that is due to open-market
trading.  More direct methods of calculating actual holding periods break down because it is not
possible to match many sales with their corresponding purchases.  Due to these data limitations,
it is not possible to compute actual returns to insider trading. We rely instead on the proxy
returns from our constructed purchase and sale portfolios.
From a scientific perspective, analysis of the purchase and sale portfolios provides a new
perspective on the strong form of market efficiency (Fama (1971)); if either portfolio earns
abnormal returns, that provides evidence against strong-form efficiency for the corresponding
asset-pricing model.  Since our methods include all returns from the day of the transaction and
do not require a pre-defined intensive-trading rule, they can provide a sharper test of this
hypothesis than is found in previous insider-trading papers.   It is important to stress that we do
not claim that the results of this previous literature are invalid, rather that they are designed to
answer different questions. Intensive-trading rules are the ideal methods for analyzing the
informativeness of insider trading for future returns and for providing outside investors with
filter rules to use this information. Throughout the paper, we distinguish between intensive-
trading studies that analyze the informativeness of insider trading, and our portfolio methods that
analyze a proxy for the returns earned by insiders themselves.
Beyond the scientific benefits it brings, our analysis also addresses policy concerns.  If
abnormal returns to the purchase and sale portfolios are large, that suggests that insiders are
earning profits from their trades.  If so, then what are the welfare implications?  There is a range
of opinion.6  Some laissez-faire observers believe that insider trading should be legal, and that
profits from it should be part of corporate compensation.  At the opposite extreme, financial
                                               
6  See Bainbridge (1998) for a survey of this debate.5
Puritans would object to the insiders’ profits as unjust enrichment, even if there were no
consequences for market (or corporate) performance.7
Lying in between is the position of American regulators, whose principal concern is to
assure that the playing field is level.  For them, abnormal returns to the purchase or sale
portfolios would be a symptom of markets that are unfair to the outside investor, who would then
be trading at an informational disadvantage.  This is unfair in itself, and furthermore undermines
outsiders’ confidence in such markets, diminishes their willingness to trade, and thereby reduces
liquidity and efficiency within financial markets.  The regulators’ market-performance concern
depends on perceptions of market fairness, not merely reality.  It is virtually impossible for
outsiders to assess their potential disadvantage in such markets, absent the detailed analysis
developed below.
Two other studies employ variants of the portfolio approach used in our paper.  Finnerty
(1976) uses the CAPM to evaluate the equally weighted returns to all insider trades in NYSE
stocks from 1969 to 1972.  He finds that buys overperform and sales underperform their CAPM
benchmarks. Though equal weighting is reasonable for his study, which is motivated solely as a
test of the strong form of market efficiency, it is clearly inappropriate as a proxy for value-
weighted insider returns. Eckbo and Smith (1998) use performance-evaluation methods on
monthly data for the complete sample of value-weighted insider holdings in Norway from 1985
to 1992. They find that Norwegian insiders do not earn abnormal returns.
Overall, we find that the purchase portfolio earns abnormal returns but the sale portfolio does
not. In raw returns, the purchase portfolio outperforms the market by 10.2 percent per year.
                                               
7 Their disapproval would not vanish, even if it could be demonstrated that insider trading brought significant net
benefits, say because it brought stock prices more firmly into alignment with appropriate values.  Their historical
ancestors objected to bear-baiting, not because of the suffering of the bear, but because of the pleasure of the people.6
Using several performance-evaluation methods, we find that about one-third of this
overperformance can be explained by insiders’ propensity to buy small stocks, “value” stocks,
and those with higher market betas.  Across the different methods, the remaining abnormal
performance ranges between 50 and 67 basis points per month. About one-quarter of these
abnormal returns accrue within the first five days after the trade and one-half accrues within the
first month.
Despite the economically significant abnormal returns to the purchase portfolio, we find
that counterparties (“outsiders”) have little to fear from these reported transactions, because
insider trades make up but a tiny portion of the market. We calculate that the expected “cost” to
outsiders due to the purchases of insiders is about 0.21 basis points over the subsequent six
months. This translates into 21 cents for a $10,000 transaction.
In raw returns, the sale portfolio performs about the same as the value-weighted market.
Consistent with previous studies, we find that insiders tend to sell “growth” stocks that have
performed well in the recent past.  When we use performance-evaluation methods to control for
this tendency, we find abnormal returns that are both economically and statistically insignificant.
This result demonstrates that the informativeness of intense trading is not necessarily a good
proxy for value-weighted insider returns: many studies find that intense insider selling forecasts
negative abnormal returns.
Following our analysis of the purchase and sale portfolios, we look at the portfolios
decomposed along several dimensions: volume of the trade, size of the firm, insider’s position in
the firm, and whether the trade is executed directly for an insider or indirectly for another party.
These categories have been studied previously using intensive-trading criteria or event-study
methods. We find that several of the results from intensive-trading studies do not carry over to7
the analysis of insider returns.  For example, purchases in small firms do not earn significantly
higher returns than do purchases in large firms, and the purchases of top executives do not earn
significantly higher abnormal returns than do those of other insiders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and provides summary
statistics.  Section 3 describes the three performance-evaluation methods we employ.  Section 4
gives the performance-evaluation results for the main insider-purchase and insider-sale
portfolios.  Section 5 analyzes decompositions of the purchase and sale portfolios by trade
volume, firm size, and the insider’s relationship to the firm. The conclusion summarizes and
interprets our results.
2. Data and Summary Statistics
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) prohibits agents from trading securities
while in possession of material inside information.  “Material insider information” can be loosely
defined as private information that a reasonable investor would consider important in the
decision to buy or sell a corporation's security.8  The enforcement of the SEA was substantially
strengthened by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.  In response, many companies instituted their own restrictions
on insider trading as safe harbor measures and to avoid any appearance of illegality.9
To facilitate enforcement of the regulations, Section 16a of the SEA requires that open-
market trades by corporate insiders be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) within ten days after the end of month in which they took place. For the purposes of this
reporting requirement, “corporate insiders” include officers with decision-making authority over
                                               
8 For a detailed discussion of the SEA, see Bainbridge (1998).
9 Jeng (1998).8
the operations of the company, all members of the board of directors, and beneficial owners of
more than ten percent of the company’s stock.  These reports, filed on the SEC’s “Form 4”, are
the source of data for almost all of the empirical studies of insider trading.10 Our data is drawn
from these Form 4 filings for the period from January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1996.  These
filings contain information about each transaction and about the insider’s relationship to the firm.
(See Appendix A for more information about Form 4.)
Our analysis focuses on open-market purchases and sales by officers and directors.  We
exclude options exercises, private transactions, and all transactions by beneficial owners. The
resulting database contains 563,863 transactions from 1975 to 1996, of which 214,897 are
purchases and 348,966 are sales.11    Sales outnumber purchases particularly in later years when
option and stock awards began to become a significant part of officers’ and directors’
compensation; such awards do not show up as purchases, but they do show up as sales when the
positions are liquidated.  The typical sale is substantially larger than the typical purchase, with
average dollar values of $136,260 per sale as compared with $35,580 per purchase.
On a value-weighted basis, what percentage of all trades are made by insiders?  This
percentage is straightforward to calculate as the dollar volume of insider purchases and sales
divided by the dollar volume of all trades.  We calculate these percentages separately each month
for both purchases and sales, and we plot the time-series of these percentages in Figure 1.  Over
the whole sample period, the average monthly ratio of value-weighted insider sales to all trades
is 0.22 percent.  Thus, an outsider making a purchase would expect 0.22 cents per dollar to have
an insider as counterparty.  The average monthly ratio of insider purchases to all trades is 0.03
                                               
10 Exceptions are Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992), Chakravarty and McConnell (1997 and 1999), and
Gompers and Lerner (1998).
11 We performed several steps to purge the data of coding errors.  See Appendix A.9
percent.  Thus, outsiders making sales would expect only 0.03 cents per dollar to be with
insiders.
Many studies of insider trading show that insiders sell stocks after they rise and buy them
after they fall.12 We also see this in our sample, as Figure 2 makes vivid.   We calculated an
abnormal return for every trade on every day, where abnormal returns are defined as the stock’s
return minus the return on the value-weighted market (NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq).  Cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) are measured relative to the trading day by adding the daily abnormal
returns for all intervening days.  These CARs are then averaged across all firms and graphed in
the figure.  Thus, this analysis equally weights all trades beginning on the day of their execution.
Figure 2 shows that, on average, an insider sale is preceded by a positive CAR of about 12
percent over the preceding 100 days, but there is no noticeable CAR after the sale.  Purchases are
preceded by a negative CAR of about two percent over the 100 days prior to the trade date, and
are followed by a positive CAR of about six percent over the subsequent 100 days.
The average CARs graphed in Figure 2 provide only a crude measure of the abnormal returns
to insider trades.  Aside from the obvious difficulties of using the value-weighted market as the
expected-return proxy for all stocks, there are also statistical problems due to biases in the
computation of CARs and the cross-sectional dependence of the abnormal returns among
transactions of the same firm and across firms.13  We sidestep these problems by constructing
“purchase” and “sale” portfolios and analyzing their returns with performance-evaluation
methods.  To construct the purchase portfolio, we “buy” all insider purchases at the closing
prices on the day of the actual trades.14  We then hold these shares in the portfolio for six
                                               
12 Seyhun (1986) and (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1998).
13 See Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1998).
14 We use closing prices on the day of the trade rather than the actual transaction prices of the insider transaction
because of concerns about errors in the reporting of transaction prices.  Please see Appendix A for a complete
discussion of this issue.10
months.  Thus, the purchase portfolio includes all shares purchased by insiders over the previous
six months. Similarly, the sale portfolio contains all shares sold by insiders over the previous six
months.
Figure 3 plots the total market value of the purchase and sale portfolios as fractions of the
overall market. We begin the analysis of these portfolios on January 1, 1976.15  As would be
expected, the sale portfolio is always larger than the purchase portfolio.  With all sales held for
six months after the insider transaction, the sale portfolio averages about 0.05 percent of the
market.  It is larger in recent years and reaches a peak of 0.13 percent of the market in 1993.  The
size of the purchase portfolio averages about 0.01 percent of the market and does not
demonstrate any obvious pattern over time.
The purchase and sale portfolios are likely to differ along many dimensions. First, we would
expect to observe more insider sales than purchases, if only to meet diversification and liquidity
objectives.  High-ranking corporate officers typically have substantial human capital invested in
their firms and often have large holdings of corporate stock and options relative to their wealth.16
In addition, much executive compensation comes in the form of stock and options, and these
additions to insiders’ personal portfolios will not show up in our database. In fact, a value-
weighted plot of option exercises (not shown here) shows a striking similarity to the plot of sales
given in Figure 1; such similarity would be expected if many sales are executed in conjunction
with option exercises.  Overall, we would expect that insider purchases are more likely than sales
to be information-driven.
                                               
15 The portfolios have incomplete six-month histories before July 1, 1975, so that prior dates would not be
comparable to subsequent ones.  We begin on the following January 1 so that we have only complete years in the
analysis.
16 Hall and Liebman (1998).11
  Second, the purchase and sale portfolios differ from each other and from the overall
market in their stock composition; insiders tend to trade in stocks that are smaller in market
capitalization than the “average” stock, with this pattern more pronounced for purchases.17 As an
illustration, we compute the fraction of the purchase and sale portfolios made up by the largest
and smallest stocks, and we compare these fractions with analogous fractions for the whole
market. These fractions are computed for July 1 of each year and then averaged across all years
from 1976 to 1996. We define the “largest” stocks as those with market capitalizations above the
cutoff for the largest third of the stocks on the NYSE.   Analogously, the “smallest” stocks are
those with market capitalizations below the cutoff for the smallest third.  Using these cutoffs, we
classify all stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  Naturally, the largest stocks comprise
a far larger component of the value of the overall market (83.1 percent) than do the smallest
stocks (5.5 percent).  In contrast, the sale portfolio derives only 35.9 percent of its value from the
largest stocks and 32.5 percent from the smallest stocks.  The purchase portfolio has an even
more extreme tilt toward small stocks, with only 22.9 percent of its value from the largest stocks
and 36.5 percent from the smallest stocks.
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (1998) show that insiders tend to buy
“value” stocks and sell “growth” stocks, as defined by several different measures of value and
growth.  This pattern also emerges in our purchase and sale portfolios, and can be illustrated with
a portfolio decomposition similar to the one performed for size. On July 1 of each year, we
calculate a book-to-market (BM) ratio for all stocks using their book value for the most recent
fiscal year (from COMPUSTAT) divided by market value as of the previous December 31.  We
then rank all NYSE stocks by their BM ratios and find the cutoffs for the highest third  (“value”)
and the lowest third (“growth”), and we use these cutoffs to classify all stocks.  Next, we
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calculate the fractions of the purchase portfolio, sale portfolio, and overall market that fall into
the value and growth categories.  These fractions are computed once per year and then averaged
across all years from 1976 to 1996. Using these definitions, the overall market consists of 50.2
percent growth stocks and 20.3 percent value stocks (and 29.5 percent in between).  Relative to
the market, the sale portfolio demonstrates a slight tilt toward growth stocks, with 54.1 percent
growth and 18.1 percent value.  The purchase portfolio exhibits a strong value tilt, with an
average of 34.3 percent growth and 29.8 percent value.
What are the returns to the purchase and sale portfolios?  Figure 4 plots the value over time
for a hypothetical investment of $1 on January 1, 1976.  Consistent with the results of Figure 2,
the purchase portfolio overperforms the market, while the sale portfolio earns returns very close
to the market.  The annualized returns are 25.8 percent for the purchase portfolio, 15.4 percent
for the sale portfolio, and 15.6 percent for the market.18  Note that an insider advantage should
yield overperformance for the purchase portfolio and underperformance for the sale portfolio. Of
course, simple comparisons of portfolio returns to the market tell only part of the story.  To learn
more, we need to use performance-evaluation methods and calculate abnormal returns.  We turn
to this task in the next section.
3. Performance Evaluation: Methods
In the section, we describe the performance-evaluation methods that we use to analyze
insider’s returns.  Since there is no consensus on the “right” model of expected returns, we
employ three methods that have proved useful in similar studies.  Our first method of
performance evaluation is the standard CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).13
Method 1:  CAPM 
t i,     t RMRF i     i      t f,  R   t i, R e b a + + = - , (1)
where Ri,t is the return on insider portfolio i in month t, Rf,t is the risk-free return in month t, and
RMRFt is the month t value-weighted market return minus the risk-free rate.  Here, ai can be
interpreted as the abnormal return to portfolio i.  Although research over the past 20 years has
produced significant evidence against this unconditional version of the CAPM, it is still used for
performance evaluation, by both academics and practitioners.19 Thus, it provides a good starting
point for our analysis.
Method 2:  4-Factor Model
One problem for the unconditional CAPM is that it cannot explain differences in returns for
portfolios sorted by standard characteristics such as size, past returns (momentum), or measures
of  “value” such as the price-to-earnings, cash-flow-to-price, and book-to-market ratios.20  Since
there is evidence that the purchase and sale portfolios differ from the market with respect to size,
momentum, and value, it is important that we adjust for these “strategies” in our analysis. The 4-
factor model of Carhart (1997) is ideally suited for this purpose and has proved useful in several
recent studies of performance evaluation.21  The model is estimated by
                                                                                                                                                      
18 This calculation ignores transactions costs, a policy that we follow throughout the paper and one that is consistent
with our purposes.  One could easily approximate the annual transactions costs for these portfolios by multiplying
portfolio turnover (100 percent, by construction) by an estimate of round trip transactions costs.
19 Examples of the CAPM's continuing role in performance evaluation are Malkiel (1995), Morningstar (1996), and
Shirk et al. (1997).
20 See Basu (1977) (P/E ratio), Banz (1981) (size), Fama and French (1993) (size and book-to-market), Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) (several value measures), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) (momentum).
21See Carhart (1997), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Daniel et. al (1997), and Metrick (1999).14
t i,     t PR1 i,4     t HML i,3     t SMB i,2      t RMRF i,1     i     t f,  R   t i, R e b b b b a + + + + + = -  ,  (2)
where Ri,t, Rf,t, and RMRFt are defined as in (1).  The terms SMBt  (small minus big), HMLt (high
minus low), and PR1t  (previous one-year return) are the month t returns to zero-investment
factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture size, book-to-market, and momentum effects,
respectively.22  Although there is an ongoing debate about whether these factors are proxies for
risk, we take no position on this issue and simply view the 4-factor model as a method of
performance attribution.  Thus, we interpret the estimated alphas as “abnormal returns” in excess
of what could have been achieved by passive zero-cost investments in the factors.
Table 1 summarizes the factor returns over the January 1976 to December 1996 sample
period.  As would be expected, average returns are positive for all of the factors: 73 basis points
a month for RMRF, 25 for SMB, 39 for HML, and 87 for PR1.  It is striking that the momentum
factor earns a higher average return than the market factor.  Note that these factor returns ignore
the transactions costs from their underlying trading strategies; such transaction costs would be
considerable for the monthly turnover necessary for PR1.  However, our insider purchase and
sale portfolios also ignore transactions costs, and thus it is reasonable to measure their
performance relative to costless strategies.
Method 3: Characteristic-Selectivity (CS) Measure
Our third measure of performance is the “characteristic-selectivity” (CS) measure developed
by Daniel et al. (1997). This method matches each insider transaction to a portfolio of similar
stocks, and then calculates an excess return relative to this portfolio on each day. This approach15
takes advantage of the transactions nature of the data, which substantially increases the precision
of abnormal return estimates under some circumstances.23  Though the procedure is conceptually
straightforward, it is notationally cumbersome. We describe the basic idea here and cover the
details in Appendix B.
To obtain the CS measure, we begin by constructing 125 “bins” through independent 5x5x5
sorts on size, book-to-market, and momentum quintiles. NYSE breakpoints are used for size and
book-to-market, and combined NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq breakpoints are used for momentum, with
all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks placed into quintiles on the basis of these breakpoints. Size and
book-to-market sorts are performed once per year (on July 1), while momentum sorts are
performed at the beginning of every month.  Therefore, stocks can change bins every month.
The three characteristics serve an analogous role to the SMB, HML, and PR1 factors in the 4-
factor model.  In the CS approach, all stocks with the necessary data are allocated to a bin, which
we call its “matching bin”.24  Next, we calculate a daily value-weighted return for each bin.
Then, for each of our insider portfolios, the monthly measure of abnormal returns is calculated as
the return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long the insider portfolio and short a portfolio
constructed using equivalent weights in the matching bins.
We write Ri,t as the return to insider portfolio i in month t and Bin i,t as the return to the
matching bins of insider portfolio i in month t.  Then, the abnormal return to portfolio i for that
month, CS i,t, is equal to the difference between these two returns: CS i,t = R i,t – Bin i,t.  For the
252 months of the sample period, the overall performance measure, CS i is written as
                                                                                                                                                      
22 This model extends the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model with the addition of a momentum factor.  For details
on the construction of the factors, see Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). We are grateful to Mark Carhart
for providing the factor returns.
23 See Metrick (1999).
24 Since some stocks must be excluded from this analysis because of a failure to match, the returns on the purchase
and sale portfolios will be slightly different here than for the factor models.  Appendix B, which discusses these
issues, shows that any potential differences are small.16
(3)                                        
252
CS
    
96   Dec
76 Jan 
t   i, ￿
= i CS
In this setup, CS i is comparable to a i from the factor models.  Its statistical significance can be
assessed by using the time-series standard error of CS i,t.
The next two sections show that these three methods provide very similar results for the
abnormal returns of insiders.  There are additional methods, of course, that could be used to
analyze returns, but no single analysis could employ all of them.25  We have no reason to believe
that our results would be qualitatively different using other methods.
4. Performance Evaluations: Results
A. Performance Evaluation of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This section applies each of the three performance-evaluation methods to the purchase and
sale portfolios.  In discussing the results, we use “performance measure” and “abnormal returns”
as synonyms. Table 2 gives the results for the purchase portfolio.    Under the CAPM, the
purchase portfolio has a significant a of 67 basis points per month.26   The CAPM b is 1.14 and
is significantly greater than one.  As we discussed in Section 2, insiders tend to purchase small
stocks, value stocks, and those with low momentum.  This strategy is also evident in the factor
loadings (or “betas”) from the 4-factor model, given in the third column of the table: positive and
significant loadings on SMB and HML, and a negative but insignificant loading on PR1.  In Table
1, we saw that the average returns are positive for all of these factors, so while the positive
loadings on SMB and HML explain some of the abnormal performance observed in the CAPM,
                                                                                                                                                      
25 For example, we do not employ any conditional factor models such as in Eckbo and Smith’s (1998) study of
insider trading in Norway.  We believe that the CS approach addresses similar concerns as do conditional models,
with the added advantage that it exploits the transactions nature of the data.17
the negative loading on PR1 works in the opposite direction. Together, these factor loadings
account for about one-quarter of the abnormal return from the CAPM, and the 4-factor model a
is a significant 50 basis points.  Notice that the adjusted R
2 for the 4-factor model is higher than
for the CAPM (.88 vs. .77), and this added explanatory power results in a relatively large
difference in the standard errors of the respective a estimates (17 vs. 13 basis points).
The CS measure for the purchase portfolio is similar to those for the CAPM and the 4-factor
model, with a significant estimate of 53 basis points.    Since the CS measure is computed using a
completely different method than are the alphas in the factor models, the similarity in results is
reassuring.  Taken together, the evidence from Table 2 shows that insiders earn economically
large abnormal returns from their purchases, with point estimates ranging between 50 and 67
basis points per month.
The results for the sales portfolio appear in Table 3.  Here, all performance measures are
economically small and statistically insignificant.  The CAPM a is –17 basis points with a
standard error of 14 basis points. The CAPM b of 1.31 is significantly greater than even the
CAPM b from the purchase portfolio.
For the 4-factor model, the loadings for the sale portfolio are different from those found for
the purchase portfolio, with these differences consistent with our analysis in Section 2 and with
the results of Rozeff and Zaman (1998).  The loading on HML is negative and significant,
suggesting a tilt toward growth stocks.  The loading on SMB, while positive, is significantly
lower than for the purchase portfolio. Interestingly, the loading on PR1, while positive, is
economically small and statistically insignificant. Thus, even though insiders tend to sell stocks
that have recently increased in price, these stocks do not subsequently perform like other high-
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momentum stocks. With these loadings, the 4-factor model yields a negative but insignificant a
of -6 basis points per month.  For the CS measure, the point estimate is an insignificant -2 basis
points per month.   In sum, there is no significant evidence that insiders earn abnormal returns in
the sale portfolio.
Overall, these results show that “outsiders” have little to fear from insiders, at least those
who report their trades.  Consider an outsider contemplating the sale of a stock.  It is possible
that this sale would be made to an insider, and insider purchases earn abnormal returns of about
700 basis points in the first six months.  However, since insiders purchase only about 0.03
percent of all stock (see Figure 1), her expected “costs” of trading against an insider are only
0.21 basis points over the six-month period.27  Thus, for a $10,000 sale, she would be willing to
pay about 21 cents to ensure that the trade did not have an insider as counterparty.   This amount
drops nearly to zero if the outsider were making a purchase from an insider.  Although insiders
make a much larger proportion of all sales (0.15 percent) than purchases, their abnormal returns
on sales are small or nonexistent.
B. The Timing of Abnormal Returns
We can better understand the dynamics of abnormal returns through a time decomposition of
the purchase and sale portfolios.  To illustrate this decomposition, consider the purchase
portfolio.  Recall that this shadow portfolio holds all insider purchases, using closing prices from
their transaction dates, and keeps them in the portfolio for exactly six months.  Now, we parse
this strategy into portfolios that hold insider purchases for different subperiods during those six
                                               
27 The calculation is 700 * .0003 = .21 basis points.  To make this calculation, we assume that stocks sold to insiders
subsequently outperform stocks sold to non-insiders by 7 percent.   We do not argue that the insider trades somehow
“cause” this edge in performance; rather, the point here is to provide another perspective on the expected value of
the insiders’ superior information.19
months: day0-day5, day5-day21, and day21-month6.   That is, when an insider trade first occurs,
it is placed into the first portfolio (day0-day5); then, at the end of day 5, the purchase is removed
from the first portfolio and placed into the second portfolio (day5-day21); etc.  The days here are
“trading days”; thus 21 days is approximately 1 month.  We follow the same procedure to
decompose the sale portfolio.
Table 4 shows annualized returns for each of these portfolios. For purchases, the annualized
returns are higher than the market in each case.  The day0-day5 portfolio, which contains all
stocks purchased in the previous five days, earns annualized returns of 57.6 percent.  Either
insiders time their purchases well or the market is somehow finding out about these purchases
and reacting to them.  Somewhat surprising, however, are the returns earned by the day0-day5
sale portfolio.  Since this portfolio holds stocks that insiders have sold over the previous five
days, the high returns suggest insiders lose money relative to the market for the first five days
after a sale.
For both purchases and sales, the same patterns over the first five days are repeated at smaller
magnitudes over the subsequent 16 days, as can be seen from the day5-day21 results.  After the
first 21 days, purchases modestly outperform the market, whereas sales perform similarly to the
market.  To give more precise statements about performance, we turn to the performance-
evaluation models.
Table 5 gives performance measures and standard errors for the day0-day5, day5-day21, and
day21-month6 purchase and sale portfolios.  The top panel gives the CAPM alphas, the middle
panel gives the 4-factor alphas, and the bottom panel gives the CS measures.   The results
confirm the significance of the patterns seen in Table 4. The day0-day5 purchase portfolio has
highly significant positive point estimates across all models; these estimates range between 25220
and 304 basis points per month. These returns illustrate the importance of using daily data to
evaluate insider performance; any study that starts on report dates or uses only monthly data will
miss this effect. These monthly abnormal returns translate into daily abnormal returns of about
13 basis points, or about 65 basis points over five trading days.  Whether this is seen as
economically “large” depends on the context.  For example, the day0-day5 portfolio completely
turns over every five trading days, far more often than any of the other portfolios studied in this
paper.  Assuming a one percent roundtrip transaction cost, the day0-day5 portfolio would incur
approximately 400 basis points in transactions costs per month.  Thus, the abnormal returns are
not sufficient to allow a profitable trading strategy after transactions costs, even if such a trading
strategy were otherwise feasible.
The purchase portfolio continues to earn abnormal returns well beyond 5 days.  The day5-
day21 portfolio earns significant abnormal returns of 129 basis points under the CAPM, 114
under the 4-factor model, and 136 for the CS measure.  For most insider transactions, more than
21 days pass before the transactions get reported and made public.  The corresponding estimates
for the day21-month6 portfolio are 54 basis points for the CAPM, 29 for the 4-factor model, and
36 for the CS measure. Of these three estimates, all but the 4-factor a are significant.  The point
estimates from Table 5 enable us to approximately decompose the overall abnormal returns to
the purchase portfolio; using either the CS measure or the 4-factor a as our guide, about one-
quarter comes in the first five days and one-half comes in the first month.28
The most striking results of Table 5 are found for the day0-day5 sale portfolio. At longer
horizons, sale portfolios fail to earn significant abnormal returns, with the alphas and CS
                                               
28 The 4-factor a estimate for the overall purchase portfolio (Table 3) is 50 basis points per month, or approximately
300 basis points for six months.  Since the point estimate for the day21-month6 portfolio is 29 basis points, we
attribute 29 * 5 = 145 of the total to the last five months.  Similar calculations for the other horizons yield the
estimates in the text.21
measures economically close to zero in most cases.  The abnormal performance for the day0-
day5 portfolio is positive and significant under all models, with point estimates ranging between
80 and 96 basis points per month.  This is approximately equivalent to 4 to 5 basis points per
trading day.  While these results are consistent with the returns presented in Table 4, they still
seem to be counterintuitive. Why would the stocks that insiders sell perform so well over the
subsequent five days?  In section 5.A, we present evidence to show that these short-horizon
returns can be explained by the recovery from the price-depressing effect of high-volume insider
sales.  That is, the patterns are consistent with a market microstructure effect.
Although the analysis in this paper is uses a six-month horizon, as motivated by the short-
swing rule, it is also interesting to see if the abnormal returns persist beyond this time. In
unreported results, we analyze purchase and sale portfolios over the month6-year1 and year1-
year3 horizons.  We find that neither the purchase nor sale portfolios earn significant abnormal
returns over these horizons, with economically small point estimates in all cases.  Thus, we
conclude that the abnormal returns to insider trading accrue within the first six months, and do
not reverse or increase afterwards.
5. Do Abnormal Returns Differ Among Different Types of Trades?
Thus far, we have confined our analysis to the aggregate purchase and sale portfolios. In this
section, we decompose the purchase and sale portfolios along four dimensions: volume of the
trade, size of the firm, insider’s position in the firm, and whether the trade is executed directly
for an insider or indirectly for another party.
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A.  The Volume of a Trade
Past research has generally found a positive relationship between trade volume and insider
informativeness, although this relationship may break down for the highest-volume trades.29  In
this section, we examine the relationship between trade volume and insider returns. There are
logical reasons to believe that the highest-volume trades would reflect the strongest insider
beliefs about corporate performance.  However, such trades may have other motivations.  For
example, insiders with sizeable corporate holdings may undertake high-volume sales for
diversification or liquidity purposes; such sales may be motivated more by a desire to reduce risk
or buy a new house than to increase returns.  Also, high-volume purchases may be related to a
quest for corporate control and its non-pecuniary benefits, and may only partially be related to
expectations of future returns.   On a more cynical note, one might believe that high-volume
trades are more likely to be scrutinized by the SEC, so that insiders who report trades on illegal
“inside information” may wish to take lower profits, by reducing or splintering trades, in order to
reduce the probability of detection.  These factors all militate against finding the highest-volume
trades having the highest abnormal returns.
We begin by decomposing the purchase and sale portfolios by trade volume into “low-
volume”, “medium-volume”, and “high-volume” purchase and sale portfolios.   To form these
portfolios, we first calculate the fraction of firm equity traded in each transaction. For example, a
purchase of 10,000 shares of a stock with 100 million shares outstanding would represent 0.01
percent of equity.  Next, we sort all trades by these equity fractions, with purchases and sales
ranked separately.   Based on these rankings, we divide purchases and sales into thirds: “low”,
                                               
29 See Seyhun (1986), Pascutti (1996), and Seyhun (1998).  Jaffe (1974) finds no difference between overall tests
and tests restricted to high-volume trades, but this may be due to his sample of only the largest NYSE firms, where
the trade-volume effect has been found to be weakest (Seyhun (1998)).23
medium”, and “high”. This yields cutoffs of 0.004 and 0.028 percent for the purchase portfolios,
and 0.010 and 0.048 percent for the sale portfolios.  That is, all sales below 0.010 percent of firm
equity are classified as “low-volume”, above 0.048 percent are classified as “high-volume”, and
in-between as “medium-volume”.30  For our purposes, this procedure offers two advantages over
simpler classifications based on absolute measures such as the number of shares or dollars
traded.   First, the absolute measures are highly correlated with firm size, and analyses based on
them might confound firm-size and trade-volume effects.  Our use of equity fractions mitigates
this problem.  Second, our approach increases the chance that trades with a large “market-
impact” are classified as “high-volume”.31  The importance of this property will be seen below.
The performance measures for the trade-volume portfolios are summarized in Table 6. To
compare estimates across the different portfolios, we estimate each model as a seemingly-
unrelated-regression (SUR) for the six decomposed purchase and sale portfolios; this framework
provides estimates for the covariance of the performance measures.32  The abnormal returns for
the high-volume and medium-volume purchase portfolios are economically large and statistically
significant on all tests, with magnitudes that are similar both to each other and to the overall
purchase portfolio.  The low-volume purchase portfolio earns considerably lower abnormal
returns, although all measures are still positive and significant. Using covariance estimates from
the SUR (not reported in Table 6), we find that the medium-volume purchase portfolio achieves
significantly higher performance measures on all three tests than does the low-volume purchase
                                               
30 We use the whole sample period to make these cutoffs, but this procedure – which looks forward as well as
backward – should not introduce any bias in this case.
31 Trades could also be classified using dollar trading volume (rather than firm equity) in the denominator.
Unfortunately, CRSP does not include volume data for Nasdaq firms until 1983, so this method is not feasible.
32 In our case, the SUR approach yields exactly the same point estimates and standard errors as would separate
estimations, and provides the covariance estimates necessary for our comparisons.  Another method to compare
performance measures is to evaluate the returns to zero-investment strategies that are long in one portfolio (e.g. low-
volume purchases) and short in another (e.g. medium-volume purchases).   The SUR and zero-investment
approaches are mathematically equivalent.24
portfolio.  Differences between the high-volume and low-volume performance measures are
significant at the ten-percent level on all tests.
Performance measures for the sale portfolios are economically small and – with one
exception – not statistically significant. Under the CAPM, the low-volume sale portfolio earns
significant negative abnormal returns, with a relatively precise point estimate of -25 basis points.
This precision derives from the well-diversified nature of the low-volume portfolio which, by
construction, cannot be dominated by a small number of positions.  Note that there is no
significant relationship between trade volume and returns for insider sales on any of the tests:
none of the performance measures is significantly different from any other.
To shed light on the counterintuitive positive abnormal returns for the day0-day5 sale
portfolio, we perform the same time decomposition for each trade-volume portfolio that we did
in Section 4.B for the overall purchase and sale portfolios.  Table 7 illustrates the returns to the
low-, medium-, and high-volume purchase and sale portfolios for the day0-day5 subperiod.  The
table gives compelling evidence that the positive abnormal returns earned by the day0-day5 sale
portfolio are driven by the highest-volume transactions.  The high-volume sale portfolio has
positive and significant performance measures under all models, with point estimates ranging
from 130 to 144 basis points.  Conversely, the performance measures for the low-volume sale
portfolio are negative and significant under all models; this is the direction that would be
expected when insiders make information-driven trades.  Our hypothesis is that the high-volume
trades are driven primarily by liquidity or diversification motives, and that these big trades cause
downward price pressure, so that the day0-day5 abnormal returns are positive while the market
“bounces back” from this pressure.33  Since price pressure is small or nonexistent for medium-
and low-volume trades, we do not observe the same positive abnormal returns for those25
portfolios. Since the high-volume trades dominate the value-weighted sale portfolio, they are
capable of driving the perverse short-run effect. This market-microstructure effect does not
prevent the high-volume purchase portfolio from earning positive returns; here, the information
component of these purchases overcomes any possible microstructure effect on prices.34
B.  Firm Size
Several studies that use intensive-trading criteria and event-study methods show that insider
trading is most informative in small firms (Seyhun (1986) and (1998), Pascutti (1996),
Lakonishok and Lee (1998)).  This empirical finding is consistent with intuition. The smaller the
firm, the easier it is for a single manager to know a significant portion of the relevant
information.  And since small firms receive less attention than large firms do from Wall Street
analysts, the smaller the firm, the more likely that insiders hold an informational advantage over
other market participants.
We analyze the relationship between firm size and insider returns by decomposing the
purchase and sale portfolios.  At the beginning of each month, we divide the stocks traded on the
NYSE into thirds based on size (market value).  We then use the cutoffs for these thirds to place
all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks into one of three categories: “small-firm”, “medium-firm”, and
“large-firm”.   Each insider transaction is then placed into a portfolio on the day of the trade
based on the size of the firm.  This holding stays in the same portfolio for the full six months,
even if the firm crosses a size cutoff.  This procedure results in six portfolios (three for purchases
and three for sales).
                                                                                                                                                      
33 This kind of volume-based autocorrelation is documented in Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994).
34 In addition, high-volume sales are bigger, on average, than high-volume purchases (see cutoffs given in Table 7),
so the microstructure effect is likely to be smaller for the purchases than for sales.26
We present the size results in Table 8.  As would be expected from the other results of this
paper, none of the sale portfolios earn significant abnormal returns under any of the methods.
The results are more interesting for the purchase portfolios. The small-firm purchase portfolio
earns significant abnormal returns under all three methods, with point estimates ranging between
31 and 49 basis points per month.  None of the other purchase portfolios earns significant
abnormal returns on any test.  Nevertheless, the performance measures for the small-firm
purchase portfolio are never significantly different from the corresponding measures for either
the medium- or large-firm purchase portfolios.35  In fact, the biggest difference occurs under the
CAPM (49 basis points for small-firm purchases vs. 16 basis points for large-firm purchases),
and some of this is certainly attributable to the small-firm anomaly in the CAPM.36  Under the 4-
factor model, the difference in abnormal returns between the small- and large-firm purchase
portfolios drops by roughly one-quarter (relative to the CAPM difference), and for the CS
measure it disappears completely.  Thus, and not surprisingly, the marginal impact of firm size
on insider returns is considerably smaller (or nonexistent) once we control for size-related return
anomalies.37  These results are not driven by our use of only three size portfolios: there remains
no significant difference between the performance measures (4-factor alphas and CS measures)
of the smallest and largest purchase portfolios even if we use five or ten size groupings.38
C. Insider’s Position within the Firm
Some insiders are more “inside” than others.  The chief executive, for example, is likely to
have better information about the firm’s prospects than do lesser officers.  Of course, since the
                                               
35 This comparison uses covariances of the performance measures (not reported in the table) estimated by SUR.
36 See Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1993).
37 This same point is made by Rozeff and Zaman (1988), although their focus is on informativeness.
38 These results are available from the authors.27
CEO’s trades are likely to be carefully scrutinized, both by shareholders and by regulators, he
may be more reluctant to trade on his informational advantage.  The net effect of these
considerations on the returns to different insiders’ trading is an empirical question.   Seyhun
(1986 and 1998) analyzes the relationship between insiders’ positions in their firms and the
informativeness of their trades, and concludes that there is an “information hierarchy”, with top
executives at the top, other officers in the middle, and directors at the bottom.  In this section we
study whether this information hierarchy extends to the returns earned by insiders themselves.
We begin by decomposing the purchase and sale portfolios based on the job title of the
insider.  “Top executives” are chief executives, chairmen of the board, and presidents.
“Officers” include all corporate officers except for top executives.  “Directors” are members of
the corporate board who are not also officers.  These categories do not overlap, and they cover
all trades in our sample.39  This decomposition results in three purchase portfolios and three sale
portfolios. The top-executive purchase portfolio constitutes 10.3 percent of the total purchase
portfolio, the officer-purchase portfolio 19.3 percent, and the director-purchase portfolio 70.4
percent.  Top-executives account for 12.2 percent of sales, officers 41.7 percent, and directors
46.1 percent.
The performance measures for these portfolios are summarized in Table 9.  We estimate each
model as a SUR so that performance estimates can be compared across portfolios.  None of the
sale portfolios earns significant abnormal returns on any of the tests.  As usual, the purchase
portfolios offer more varied results.  The officer-purchase and director-purchase portfolios have
significant abnormal returns under all tests, with point estimates close to those found for the
                                               
39 These definitions differ slightly from Seyhun’s (1998), which do allow for overlap. Some insiders do not fit into
any of these categories. We exclude them  from the beginning; they are not represented in the purchase and sale
portfolios.  Please see Appendix A.28
overall purchase portfolio.  The top-executive purchase portfolio earns significant abnormal
returns under the CAPM and 4-factor models.   Overall, there is no evidence that the top
executives earn higher abnormal returns than do other officers and directors.  Of course, top
executives trades tend to be of higher volume than those of other officers and directors, so they
may indeed be taking out some rents through higher dollar returns per trade.
D. Direct vs. Indirect Ownership of Shares
Insider’s holdings can be subdivided into two broad categories.  “Direct” holdings are held in
the insider’s name.  “Indirect” holdings are held in the name of another person, where the
corporate insider has a pecuniary interest, by reason of any contract, understanding, or
relationship.40  With the exception of Pascutti (1996), past studies of insider trading have not
distinguished between these two types of ownership.
In this section, we divide the sale and purchase portfolios into their direct and indirect
components.  Thus, the direct-purchase portfolio contains all purchases for direct holdings made
over the previous six months; the other portfolios are indirect-purchases, direct-sales, and
indirect-sales.   The direct portfolios comprise the majority of both the purchase and sales
portfolios, but the indirect portfolios are still substantial, comprising 42.6 percent of the sale
portfolio and 22.2 percent of the purchase portfolio.
It is not obvious what to expect for the relative performance of direct and indirect portfolios.
For direct trades, insiders are likely to exercise total discretionary control and keep all the
proceeds.  In many indirect trades, insiders exercise considerably less discretion and have
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smaller personal incentives.   This suggests that direct trades would be more likely to reflect
insider information and yield higher abnormal returns.
However, insiders make many of their direct trades – particularly those of high volume – to
diversify their portfolios or gain more control of the corporation.  Indirect trades, on the other
hand, are less likely to be driven by considerations of control or diversification, especially since
indirect holders usually do not have their human capital invested in the firm.    Similarly,
purchases designed to increase control are probably more likely for a direct holding than for an
indirect one.  Since these considerations are stronger for high-volume transactions, they have the
potential to dominate a value-weighted analysis.  This reasoning suggests that abnormal returns
would be higher for indirect trades than for direct ones.
Table 10 summarizes the evidence for the direct and indirect purchase and sale portfolios.
Once again, we estimate each model as a SUR so that the performance estimates can be
compared across portfolios. The CAPM a for the direct-purchase portfolio is 81 basis points; the
corresponding a for the indirect-purchase portfolio is 66 basis points.  These point estimates are
significantly different from zero, but not from each other.    The 4-factor alphas and CS measures
show a similar pattern.  The direct-purchase portfolio earns a 4-factor a of 63 basis points and a
CS measure of 79 basis points, both of which are significant.   The indirect-purchase portfolio
has a 4-factor a of 51 basis points and a CS measure of 49 basis points.  For each of the three
tests, the performance measure for the direct-purchase portfolio has a higher point estimate than
the corresponding measure for the indirect-purchase portfolio, but the difference is never
significant. For the direct-sales and indirect-sales portfolios, all of the performance measures are
economically small and statistically insignificant.   Overall, there is no significant evidence of
differential abnormal returns between direct and indirect trades.30
6. Conclusion
There are three good reasons to study reported insider trading: science, profit, and policy.
Science examines the implications of the findings for market efficiency.  Profit hopes to develop
optimal trading strategies, following the actions of insiders.  Policy seeks to determine the
effectiveness of insider-trading rules, and the implications of any insider advantages for both
fairness and market performance.
Our analysis focused on science and policy.  It began with the central question: When
corporate insiders trade their company’s stock, what returns do they earn? While data limitations
make it impossible to give an exact answer to this question, we construct a proxy by exploiting
the “short-swing’’ rule of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  Since this rule prevents
insiders from keeping any profits earned in offsetting trades within six months of each other, we
assume that all trades are held for six months and then compute returns to value-weighted
portfolios comprised of all insider trades.  We then analyze these returns using modern
performance-evaluation methods.
Insiders’ transactions differ from the market as a whole.  Insiders disproportionately
purchase shares in small firms, value firms, and those that have recently underperformed.  Their
sales are made mainly in growth firms that have experienced high recent returns.  To correct for
differences in returns that may be driven entirely by these distinctive characteristics of insider
transactions, we calculated abnormal returns using three different performance-evaluation
methods.  Under all three methods, the story is much the same.  The point estimates of the
abnormal returns to a value-weighted portfolio of all insider purchases—holding positions for six
months—are between 50 and 67 basis points per month, an economically and statistically31
significant magnitude. The first five days after purchase yield approximately one-quarter of the
abnormal return, and about one-half comes within the first month.  This evidence suggests that
insider buyers have a good feel for near-term developments within their firm, and/or that actions
by others who follow their trades move the market.  None of our methods find abnormal returns
for the sale portfolio. If the any of the performance-evaluation methods are interpreted as an
equilibrium asset-pricing model, then the results for the purchase portfolio provide evidence
against the strong form of market efficiency under that model.
Our performance-evaluation methods can readily determine whether particular types of
trades do better or worse.  Thus, we look at abnormal returns by firm size, trade volume, and the
insider’s position within the firm.  We find that the trades of top executives do not earn higher
abnormal returns than do those of their less lofty peers.  Similarly, firm size does not
significantly affect abnormal returns.  We do find that low-volume purchases have smaller
abnormal returns than those of higher-volume.
Our analysis does not attempt to look at the potential for profit by following insiders’
trades; other methods are better suited to that investigation, and the prior literature has covered
them well.  The potential for profit by outsiders is based on the “informativeness” of insider
trading for future returns.  Informativeness is typically tested using various filter rules about the
intensity of insider trading. This is conceptually distinct from the returns earned by insiders
themselves.  Indeed, our results show that even though several types of insider trading may be
informative, they do not necessarily imply that insiders themselves earn abnormal returns.
Insider sales are one example of this phenomenon: several filter rules based on insider sales have
been found to be informative for future returns, but we find that our sale portfolio does not earn
abnormal returns.  Similarly, the purchases of top executives are found to be more informative32
than those of other insiders, but we find that top executives do not earn higher abnormal returns.
There is nothing inconsistent about these pairings of results – the underlying questions and
methods are different.
What should policy makers think of our results?  Surely insiders have valuable
information.  If they do, only a Draconian regulatory system could prevent them from trading
profitably, and the evidence shows that the existing system does not.  Policy makers can be
reassured, however, that the system is sufficiently effective -- presumably by holding down both
the volume and profitability of insider trades -- that outsiders are only slightly disadvantaged
when selling stock on the open market, and they are not disadvantaged at all when buying.
Inside purchases comprise just 0.03% of all purchases on the open market; on average, outsiders
lose just 21 cents on a $10,000 sale because an insider may be on the other side. But in circles
where this happy information is not widely known, investors with inflated perceptions of their
disadvantage may still be reluctant to trade.
Our principal accomplishment in this paper was to quantify the tilt in the playing field
enjoyed by insiders.   Due to the disparity of numbers between insiders and outsiders, what
appears as an easy downward slide for the insiders produces an imperceptible upward tilt for
those who must trade against them. The question of fairness falls to the eye of the beholder.33
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Appendix A – Data Issues
Form 4 must be filed with the SEC within ten days following the end of each month in
which there is a change in direct or indirect insider ownership.  Among the information required
on Form 4 are: name and address of reporting person, issuer name and ticker or trading symbol,
relationship of reporting person to the issuer (i.e., officer, director, etc.), filing date, type of
security traded, transaction date (month/day/year), transaction code (e.g., open-market
transaction, private transaction, transaction under an employee stock ownership plan), number of
equity securities traded, per share price of equity securities, ownership form (direct or indirect).41
We restrict our study to open-market transactions in equity securities that have data
available from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).  Over the January 1, 1975, to
December 31, 1996, sample period, there were 899,146 open-market transactions (386,102
purchases and 513,044 sales). 42   Of this number, 17,340 (1.9 percent) have missing transaction
dates, leaving 881,806.  We next purged duplicate transactions, those with identical data in all
categories, from our sample.  We believe these duplicates can occur for many innocuous reasons.
This step removes 57,145 (6.5 percent) and leaves 824,661.
Prior to May 1991, Form 4 distinguished between open-market purchases and sales
(transaction codes P and S) and private transactions (transaction codes J and K).  During this
period, open-market transactions outnumber private transactions by a ratio of about 11 to 1.
After May 1991, private transactions use the same codes as open-market transactions.  Ideally,
we would exclude private transactions from our database; these transactions may take place with
restricted securities, the counterparty often knows he is trading with an insider, and the trade is
much more likely to be executed for liquidity or diversification motives than are open-market
                                               
41 Goodman (1991).37
transactions.  Therefore, we do not include any private transactions prior to May 1991, and we
use several filter rules, discussed below, to eliminate the largest private transactions after this
date.  These same filter rules also purge the data of obvious coding errors.
Our first filter removes all transactions where the shares traded exceed trading volume for
that day.  Since private transactions would not be included in the exchange traded volume of the
day, this filter is likely to catch many of the largest post-1991 private transactions.  This
eliminates 4,030 transactions (0.5 percent) and leaves us with 820,631.  Our second filter purges
all transactions whose prices fall outside the daily trading range reported on CRSP.  We call
these “bad prices”. There are many reasons that bad prices can occur: a private transaction may
be executed outside of the range; the date, price, or transaction type may be miscoded by the
insider; input error may be made by the data provider, etc.  The frequency of these problems,
given below, is high enough to dissuade us from using the reported transaction prices in our
analysis.  Furthermore, most of the reasons given for bad prices would also render the transaction
unsuitable to be included in the purchase and sale portfolios, even using the closing prices.
Our analysis suggests that the majority of transactions with “bad prices” are due to
misreports or miscodes of the date (either by the insider or the data provider).  Our procedure
necessitates that we first purge all transactions where CRSP provides no information on the
trading range.  This results in a loss of 35,431 transactions (4.3 percent).  Of the remaining
785,200 transactions, 221,337 (28.2 percent) have bad prices.  To see how many of these may be
due to simple miscodes of the date (perhaps because the filing date is miscoded as the trading
date), we calculate a trading range beginning on the first day of the previous month and
extending until the last day of the current month.  Out of 221,337 trades with bad prices, 163,141
                                                                                                                                                      
42 For transaction dates after May 1991, there are also some private transactions in our data set.  Our methods for
disentangling these trades from open-market transactions are discussed below.38
(73.7 percent) fall within this extended trading range.  The remaining 58,196 trades with bad
prices are likely to be private transactions not caught in the previous filter, and other miscodes by
the insider or the data provider.  Our final data set includes 563,863 transactions (214,897
purchases and 348,966 sales).
These filters could not catch all possible errors in the data.  For example, any miscoded
dates that do not have bad prices will remain in the data set.   Since such trades must necessarily
be in stocks with small price changes around the transactions, they are likely to bias our
abnormal returns toward zero.  Our diagnostic tests suggest that the value-weighted fraction of
such bad trades is likely to be small and should not cause qualitative changes in our results.
Similarly, some private transactions will escape the filters.  Since our filters would have caught
about 72 percent of the private transactions before May 1991, and the ratio of private
transactions to open-market transactions is small, we doubt that eliminating the remaining
private transactions would qualitatively change the results.
Appendix B – The Characteristic-Selectivity (CS) Measure
This appendix details the computation of the CS measure described in Section 3.  This
measure is based on the methodology of Daniel et al. (1997).  For each insider transaction
portfolio, the monthly measure of abnormal returns is calculated as the return on a zero-
investment portfolio that is long in the insider transaction portfolio and short in a portfolio
constructed using equivalent weights in the matching bins.  In effect, this just combines the
monthly abnormal returns for each stock in the portfolio.
The assumption underlying this model is that all stocks in the same bin have exactly the
same expected return.  If this assumption is satisfied, then the performance measure will have a39
zero expected return at all times.  Thus, the insider portfolios that shift their portfolio
composition conditional on expected factor realizations will have no bias in their estimated
performance measure.
A more formal description of the methodology is:
d. day  on    i   portfolio by    s stock  on    placed   weight    d s(i), W
and   d, day  on    s stock     to matched   b bin  for  return  net      d b(s), R
d, day  on    s stock  for  return  net      d s, R
s, stock     to matched   b bin     : b(s)
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Using this notation, the CS measure for each month, CSi,t, is then calculated as
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where  ( ) ￿ ˛ *
i s s,d s(i),d R W  is the actual net return for portfolio i on day d, and  ( ) ￿ ˛ *
i s d b(s), d s(i), R W
is the net return that would be achieved on day d if all funds were invested in the matching bins.
The CSi measure (Equation 3) is then calculated as the mean of the monthly CSi,t measures.
Not all stocks will be included in the CS calculation; if a stock cannot be matched to a
bin, then it is not included in the test. The two main reasons for a failure to match are, first,
insufficient past returns for a momentum calculation and, second, the absence of a book-equity
observation in COMPUSTAT. Both of these data requirements lead to new issues being deleted
from the portfolios. To the extent that new issues underperform similar stocks, this causes an40
upward bias in the estimated selectivity performance measure.43  If such an upward bias exists, it
does not seem to have a significant effect on the results.  For example, when we repeat the
CAPM and 4-factor tests of Tables 2 and 3 using returns calculated only from stocks that have
bin assignments, then the results are almost identical: the CAPM a is 45 basis points for
purchases (two points lower than the corresponding a of 47 basis points in Table 2) and –9 basis
points for sales (exactly the same as the corresponding a in Table 3); the 4-factor a is 42 basis
points for purchases (five points higher than the corresponding a of 37 basis points in Table 2)
and nine basis points for sales (four basis points higher than the corresponding a of five basis
points in Table 3).
                                               
43 See Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) for evidence on the new-issues bias. On a “bin-
adjusted” basis, Brav and Gompers’ (1997) work suggests that this bias should not be large. See also Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995) for a discussion of the bias induced by omitting stocks that do not have data in
COMPUSTAT.Figure 1
Percentage of Market Volume Traded by Insiders
This figure plots insiders’ purchases and sales as a percentage of market volume for each
month of the sample period.  The percentage is calculated as the total value in all
securities of insider purchases (sales) for that month divided by the total value of all
monthly trading on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  The average percentages across the










































































































Purchase Percentage Sale PercentageFigure 2
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Measured from the Date of Insider Transactions
This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) measured from the date
of insider purchase and sale transactions.  Daily abnormal returns are defined here as a
stock’s return minus the value-weighted market return. These daily abnormal returns are
calculated for the day of the transaction (day 0) and for each of the 100 days before and
after the transaction.  The CAR for day -t is the sum of daily abnormal returns beginning
on day -t and ending on day 0.  The CAR for day t is the sum of the daily abnormal
returns beginning on day 0 and ending on day t.  This procedure yields a time-series of
CARs for each insider purchase and sale; these CARs are averaged across all purchases






























































Purchase CAR Sale CARFigure 3
Insider Purchase and Sale Portfolios as a Percentage of Total Market Capitalization
This figure shows the percentage of the market held in insider purchase and sale
portfolios.  The purchase (sale) portfolio includes all shares purchased (sold) by insiders
over the previous six months.   On each day, we calculate the percentage of the total
market value (NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq) held in each of these portfolios. Monthly
percentages are expressed as the mean of the daily percentages from that month. These
monthly percentages are then plotted in the figure. For the sample period of January 1,
1976 to December 31, 1996, the averages of these monthly percentages are 0.02 percent









































































































Returns to Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This figure plots the value of a hypothetical $1 investment on January 1, 1976, in the
purchase portfolio, sale portfolio, and the value-weighted market. The purchase (sale)
portfolio includes all shares purchased (sold) by insiders over the previous six months.
The value-weighted market includes all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms.  The
annualized returns to these portfolios are 25.8 percent for purchases, 15.4 percent for










Purchase Sale MarketTable 1
Summary Statistics of Factor Returns
This table provides summary statistics for the factors used in the CAPM (equation
1) and the 4-factor model (equation 2).  These factors –  RMRF, SMB, HML, and
PR1 – represent the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture
market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively.  (Consult
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) on the construction of these factors.)
The sample is from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.
Factor Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
RMRF 0.73% 4.27 % - 22.77% 12.68 %
SMB 0.25 2.53 - 9.79 9.06
HML 0.39 2.53 - 8.49 8.92
PR1 0.87 2.81 - 10.65 10.02Table 2
Performance-Evaluation Results for Purchase Portfolio
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for the purchase portfolio.  The
purchase portfolio includes all shares purchased by insiders over the previous six
months.  Column 2 gives the results for the CAPM (equation 1).  Column 3 gives the
results for the 4-factor model (equation 2).  Column 4 gives the results for the CS
measure (equation 3).  For the factor models, a is the regression intercept, and the
next four rows give coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for the
independent variables: RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1.  These independent variables
are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-
to-market, and momentum effects, respectively. (Consult Fama and French (1993)
and Carhart (1997) on the construction of these factors.)  The symbols * and **
indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels, respectively.
The bottom row of the table provides the R
2 for the factor regressions.  The sample is
from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.


















2 0.7665 0.8842Table 3
Performance-Evaluation Results for Sale Portfolio
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for the sale portfolio.  The sale
portfolio includes all shares sold by insiders over the previous six months.  Column 2
gives the results for the CAPM (equation 1).  Column 3 gives the results for the 4-
factor model (equation 2).  Column 4 gives the results for the CS measure (equation
3).  For the factor models, a is the regression intercept, and the next four rows give
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for the independent variables:
RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1.  These independent variables are the returns to zero-
investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and
momentum effects, respectively. (Consult Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) on the construction of these factors.)  The symbols * and ** indicate two-tail
significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels, respectively.  The bottom row
of the table provides the R
2 for the factor regressions.  The sample is from January 1,
1976 to December 31, 1996.


















2 0.8628 0.9402 Table 4
Annualized Returns for
 Time Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table provides the annualized returns for decompositions of the purchase and
sale portfolios into three holding periods: day0-day5, day5-day21, and day21-
month6.  At the close of trading on the day of an insider transaction, the purchase
or sale is placed into the day0-day5 portfolio; at the end of day 5, the trade is
removed from the previous portfolio and placed into the day5-day21 portfolio;
etc. This decomposition is done separately for purchases and sales.  The sample is
from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.  The bottom row shows the
annualized return on the value-weighted market for the same sample period.
day0-day5 day5-day21 day21-month6
Purchase 57.6% 34.7% 23.2%
Sale 28.9 18.9 15.3
Market 15.6% 15.6% 15.6%Table 5
Performance-Evaluation Results for
 Time Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and sale
portfolios into four holding periods: day0-day5, day5-day21, and day21-month6.  At the close of trading on
the day that an insider transaction occurs, the purchase or sale is placed into the day0-day5 portfolio; at the
end of day 5, the trade is removed from the previous portfolio and placed into the day5-day21 portfolio;
etc.This decomposition is done separately for purchases and sales. The top of the chart shows the
regression intercepts, a, from the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from
the 4-factor model (equation 2).  The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors
appear in parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent and one-










































 Trade-Volume Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and sale
portfolios by trade volume.  To form our component portfolios, we first calculate the percentage of firm
equity traded in each transaction.  Next, we sort all trades by these equity percentages, with purchases and
sales ranked separately.   Based on these rankings, we divide purchases and sales into thirds: “low-
volume”, “medium-volume”, and “high-volume”.  This yields cutoffs of 0.004 and 0.028 percent for the
purchase thirds, and 0.010 and 0.048 percent for the sales thirds; i.e, all sales below 0.010 percent of firm
equity are classified as low-volume, above 0.048 percent are classified as high-volume, and in-between as
medium-volume.  The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a, from the CAPM (equation 1).
The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model (equation 2).  The bottom portion
shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate
two-tail significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels, respectively. The sample is from January 1,









































Performance-Evaluation Results for Trade-Volume
Decompositions of the day0-day5 Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the day0-day5 purchase and
sale portfolios by trade volume.  The day0-day5 purchase (sale) portfolio includes all shares purchased
(sold) by insiders over the previous five days. To decompose these portfolios by trade volume, we first
calculate the percentage of firm equity traded in each transaction. Next, we sort all trades by these equity
percentages, with purchases and sales ranked separately.   Based on these rankings, we divide purchases
and sales into thirds: “low-volume”, “medium-volume”, and “high-volume”.  This yields cutoffs of 0.004
and 0.028 percent for the purchase thirds, and 0.010 and 0.048 percent for the sales thirds; i.e, all sales
below 0.010 percent of firm equity are classified as low-volume, above 0.048 percent are classified as high-
volume, and in-between as medium-volume.  The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a, from
the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model (equation
2).  The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The
symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels, respectively. The










































 Firm-Size Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and sale
portfolios by firm size. At the beginning of each month, we divide the NYSE into thirds based on size
(market value).  We then use the cutoffs for these thirds to place all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks into one
of three categories: “small-firm”, “medium-firm”, and “large-firm”.   Each insider transaction is then
placed into a portfolio on the day of the trade based on the size of the firm.  This position stays in the same
portfolio for six months, even if the underlying firm crosses a size cutoff.  This procedure results in six
portfolios (three for purchases and three for sales).  The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a,
from the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model
(equation 2).  The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in
parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels,









































Performance-Evaluation Results for Job-Title Decompositions
of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and sale
portfolios by job title of insider.  “Top executives” are the subset of corporate officers that hold the title of
chief executive, chairman of the board, or president.  “Officers” include all corporate officers except for top
executives.  “Directors” are members of the corporate board who do not also hold an officer title.  These
categories do not overlap and cover all trades in our sample.  This decomposition results in three purchase
portfolios and three sale portfolios.  The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a, from the
CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model (equation 2).
The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The
symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels, respectively. The
sample is from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.
Purchase Sale
CAPM








director    0.0072**





























Performance-Evaluation Results for Decompositions of the
Purchase and Sale Portfolios between Direct and Indirect Trades
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and sale
portfolios between direct and indirect trades.  Securities owned directly are those held in the reporting
person's name.  Securities owned indirectly are those held in the name of another person in which a
reporting person has a pecuniary interest, by reason of any contract, understanding or relationship
(including a family relationship or arrangement).  The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a,
from the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model
(equation 2).  The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in
parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels,
respectively. The sample is from January 1, 1976, to December 31, 1996.
Purchase Sale
CAPM
direct 0.0081**
(0.0018)
-0.0019
(0.0015)
indirect 0.0066**
(0.0021)
-0.0018
(0.0017)
4-Factor Model
direct 0.0063**
(0.0014)
-0.0004
(0.0011)
indirect 0.0051*
(0.0020)
-0.0016
(0.0015)
CS Measure
direct 0.0079**
(0.0013)
-0.0002
(0.0010)
indirect 0.0049*
(0.0022)
-0.0007
(0.0015)